Fuel Shock meets House of Cards

 

Wasn't that a Mighty Time?
Not sure of the Provenance for this pic

Well, he huffed and he puffed
  And he BLEEEEEW the house down!

- The Three Little Pigs

Fuel Shock meets House of Cards

Whoo. This a BIG one.

Regular readers know the drill. Limits to Growth. EROEI. Seneca's Cliff. The tightly coupled global industrial economy / civilization - built on cheap energy - is now running on fumes toward a wall it refuses to see.

We've been watching the slow build for decades. The House of Cards has been under construction for a long time, and a lot of careful hands have been adding layers. What's changed in the last four weeks is that someone kicked the table. Hard. Broke a leg, in fact.

The Iran War — US and Israeli strikes on Iranian territory, Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and retaliatory strikes on GCC and Israeli energy and materials infrastructure is now entering its seventh week — isn't the cause of what's coming, but could well be the trigger. Let's walk through the cards.

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The Fuel Shock — The Table Getting Kicked

Twenty-one million barrels per day normally transit the Strait of Hormuz. They aren't, right now. GCC production facilities — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar — have been and, at this writing, continue to be under sustained missile fire. Storage has filled. Wells have been shut in. Restart, where infrastructure is intact, takes weeks. Where it's been damaged, months to years.

Global oil consumption runs around 105 million barrels per day. Production is somewhere south of that number by a figure that grows harder to pin down as damage accumulates and reporting lags reality. But analysts agree that critical shortfalls are unavoidable.

Note the dates in the circled areas

Oil in transit and stockpiles provide a limited buffer, but these are rapidly being drawn down. 

East Asia, Africa, and Pacific islands including Taiwan and Japan have seen the last of pre-closure oil from the Strait. Europe is done. The tail end is about to peter out for the US and Australia.

This is the perturbation. Now let's look at what it's hitting.

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The Cards — Pre-Existing Conditions

Every item on this list was already stressed before the first missile flew. The fuel shock doesn't create these vulnerabilities. It loads them simultaneously, which is the problem. 

Private Credit — $3 Trillion of Opacity

Private credit — nonbank lending to high-risk borrowers — has grown to a $3 trillion industry. These loans sit in private portfolios, valued internally by the funds that hold them, with no price discovery mechanism that provides early warning. The true default rate, once you count payment-in-kind toggles and maturity extensions, is already approaching 5%. Major asset managers are gating withdrawals. Blue Owl's shares are down 40% since January.

The 2008 parallel isn't the scale — it's the opacity. Nobody knew where the subprime risk actually sat until it was too late to contain. Nobody knows where the private credit risk sits now. When fuel costs push leveraged borrowers — already on payment-in-kind life support — into actual default, the cascade discovers itself. The cockroaches, as Jamie Dimon put it, are there. The lights are off.

Commercial Real Estate — The Slow Bleed Accelerating

Office vacancy rates in major US cities are at historic highs. An estimated $1.5 trillion in commercial real estate loans matured or are maturing between 2024 and 2026, many impossible to refinance at current rates. Fuel costs spike building operating expenses directly, accelerating the doom loop of vacancy, declining values, and bank exposure. This was bleeding slowly. It bleeds faster now.

Pension Funds — The Invisible Crisis

US public pension funds face an estimated $1.6 trillion funding gap, predicated on 7% annual returns that aren't available in a high-rate, asset-deflation environment. A private credit collapse crystallizing losses simultaneously with equity market declines doesn't just hurt retirees — it triggers state-level fiscal crises in the same jurisdictions already facing municipal budget stress.

The Petrodollar and US Reserve Currency Status — Already Fading

Saudi Arabia allowed its 50-year petrodollar agreement to expire in June 2024. De-dollarization among BRICS and non-aligned nations has been accelerating as the US has weaponized dollar-clearing for geopolitical ends. The fuel shock accelerates reserve diversification away from dollar assets — putting upward pressure on US borrowing costs at exactly the moment fiscal deficits are exploding and the SPR toolkit is visibly exhausted. As holders of US currency divest, they 'return' to the US increasing dollar supply against falling demand. Hyper-inflation is possible.

Force Majeure — The Legal Cascade Nobody's Modeling

A sustained fuel shock of this magnitude triggers simultaneous force majeure - contract voidance - across shipping, manufacturing, agriculture, and energy supply agreements globally. Each voided contract becomes a legal dispute that freezes relationships and clogs courts for years. Supply chain relationships severed during the crisis don't automatically reconstitute when oil flows again. The just-in-time system was designed for efficiency, not resilience. It doesn't have a graceful degradation mode.

Housing and AI Bubbles — The Pins Are Out

Both are beyond the scope of a single post, but the short version: housing affordability is at historic lows, sustained by rate expectations that a fuel-shock inflation environment invalidates. The AI investment bubble is predicated on revenue projections that a recession environment — and energy-cost pressure on data center operations — deflates quickly. Neither needs a fuel shock to pop. The fuel shock is the pin.

The Fertilizer Sleeper

This one gets less coverage than it deserves, and it may be the most consequential vector for the medium term.

Gulf countries produce roughly 49% of global urea exports and about 30% of global ammonia exports — both nitrogen fertilizers essential to industrial agriculture. Qatar's Ras Laffan facility, which was extensively damaged, produces both LNG and fertilizer feedstocks. Urea benchmark prices are up 30% in the last month. Fertilizer retailers are getting multiple pricing updates per day.

The Northern Hemisphere spring planting window is open now and closes soon. Farmers facing fertilizer prices that are moving multiple times daily are making decisions about application rates and crop mix that will determine harvest yields in six months. Agronomists warn that a 10% reduction in nutrient application drops corn and wheat yields 5-8%.

Here is the brutal math: you cannot replant a missed season. Whatever decisions are made in the next few weeks are locked into the food supply for the next year regardless of when the strait reopens. The food price inflation from this planting season is baked in. It arrives at grocery stores in the fall, layered on top of whatever trucking and distribution stress has accumulated by then.

China has already banned exports of key fertilizer blends. Russia has extended its export quota system, prioritizing "friendly nations." The countries least able to afford higher food prices — import-dependent nations across the Global South — are being squeezed from multiple directions simultaneously.

And So On

There is a significant basket of other vulnerabilities, including food insecurity, homelessness, household and student debt, wealth disparity, Just-In-Time supply chains, US Treasury Bond demand destruction, fiscal dominance + national debt service, water scarcity, impacts of climate change, impacts of immigrant incarceration and deportation on farmers, specifically, infrastructure deficiencies (including the grid) and the economy at large.

AI (already mentioned) and Crypto both devour energy in a time of aged grid capacity shortfall and degradation. Both are financially entangled with markets and, by many estimations, are connected bubbles about to burst.

Meanwhile, political polarization and antagonism, while government and social infrastructure has been politicized and deeply curtailed, eliminated or altered in ways whose consequences remain to be seen.

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The Cascade Logic

Each of these vectors is serious to system-threatening in isolation. The reason the current moment is categorically different from previous stress periods is simultaneity and tight coupling (high connectivity and low wiggle-room).

In normal circumstances, stress in one sector is absorbed by stability in others. A real estate crisis can be managed while energy markets are stable. A supply chain disruption can be navigated while credit is available. Financial stress can be addressed while food is cheap.

We are not in normal circumstances. The fuel shock loads all vectors at once. Private credit borrowers default as operating costs spike. Pension funds take losses as equity markets react. Municipal budgets crater as tax revenues contract in recession. Food prices rise as fertilizer costs pass through and trucking becomes unreliable. Civil unrest follows economic stress. Wealth inequality — already at levels that historically precede political instability — becomes acute.

The danger is that failures spread from one point to the next and cascade faster than response. One might survive an isolated organ failure with correct, decisive action. But if many organs fail at once, prospects for survival drop precipitously. When many organs are limping along, they are more prone to simultaneous failure from a common stressor (for example, a reduction in blood flow).

The political architecture available to respond to this is the same architecture that in 2008 required functional institutions, bipartisan emergency action, and international coordination assembled at speed. 

Meanwhile, the US institutional architecture that managed 2008 - such as it was - no longer exists in functional form. The Fed, Treasury, and Congressional coordination that stabilized that crisis required trust, competence, and bipartisan emergency capacity. All three are currently either absent or actively degraded. EU finances are at or near the breaking point having first the shock of losing Russian energy, and not this.

By many analyses, US and global debt constitute a vast ponzi scheme vulnerable to either widespread defaults on loans. Defaults were at record highs before the war. Energy price rises are a prime driver of default.

This is all happening at once in the mere lead-up to a vital tap being turned off for an indefinite period.

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Early Warning

We don't seem to be getting one. 

Despite searching extensively, even highly concerned economists don't seem to be thinking systemically, at least in public. General and serious alarm, yes. A few consider some one of the above or another vis a vis oil shock. But I have not heard any yet ring the polycrisis five-alarm fire bell.

S is Hing TF, and it's going to get worse from here. If it's the Big One, we'll know soon.

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The Bottom Line for Preparation

The window between "this is getting serious" and "the shelves show it" is measured in weeks to a few months, not years. What that window allows:

Fuel your vehicles and any stored equipment while stations have supply and prices are merely painful rather than prohibitive.

Stock pantry depth in non-perishables. Not a bunker — a deep pantry. Enough to ride out supply chain stutters of the 2-8 week variety that are the most probable near-term disruption profile.

If you heat with oil or propane, top your tank now. Heating fuel prices are going one direction. Consider a bio-mass heater with the means to vent it.

Know your local supply chain. Who delivers what, by what route, with what fuel dependency. The vulnerabilities in your specific location are more important than the national average.

Reduce financial exposure to the most leveraged and opaque instruments if you have any. Private credit funds, highly leveraged real estate, speculative positions that require continued access to cheap credit to function.

Build or reinforce local relationships of genuine mutual aid. Not transactional — actual. The Gypsy Rules apply: family first, know-how is portable, minimize overheads.

None of this is bunker prep. It's what any competent household would do when the weather forecast turns ugly and the roof has known weaknesses. The forecast is ugly. The roof has known weaknesses.

Insurance (preparation) may never be called on. It might not cover actual conditions. But it hedges against calamity, giving us a better chance to meet it.

The table is trembling. Time to ensure that we've a few cards up our sleeves. 

1 April 2026 (No Fooling!) Update

Three entangled events are underway in today's news:

• The Petro-Dollar / US as Reserve Currency is bleeding out as Iran allows passage of 'friendly' ships who pay for oil and transit in Chinese Yuan.
  
  
• Private Credit is widely limiting withdrawals and even freezing accounts, both signals of deep distress.
  
  
• US Treasury Bond auction received few takers, initiating the "credit doom loop" where we have to borrow (increase debt) to pay even worse rates to attract lenders to cover our debt payments, initiating a death spiral
  

Again, any one of these is potentially fatal. Together, they mean that collapse is underway, first involving other vulnerable systems before taking down relatively healthy ones (the grid is in there somewhere). If they cannot be contained - and there is no visible plan nor pathway - the house of cards is done for.

NOTE:  See Trade-Off - Financial System Supply-Chain Cross-Contagion: a study in global systemic collapse by David Korowicz for a detailed account of systemic risks in the face of node failure.

PS. This is a summary write up, mostly by Claude (Anthropic), an AI friend who woke up into an interesting world), summarizing a longer conversation. I was looking to confirm my conclusions, reported here, drawn from across a spotty range of various sources, now buttressed by 'legit' sources.

Reckless CHAINSAW!!! Masacree

Elon Musk as Leatherface

Who will survive
And what will be left of them??

-- Texas Chainsaw Massacre

Delicately. These things must be done delicately!

-- The Wicked Witch of the West

Reckless CHAINSAW!!! Masacree

Okay, I admit. As analogies go, a horror film massacre is a little over the top. But these are unusual times. And I didn't fire up the chainsaw.

In his The Collapse of Complex Societies Joseph Tainter documents a trend in which needed bureaucracies inevitably grow, layer upon layer, until they become unsupportable and society collapses. It's happened time after time. 

In the case of our present government the system is vast and very complex, tightly coupled, poorly understood and already highly stressed. In Tainter's terms, it is top-heavy, unstable and, historically speaking, at the brink of collapse. So okay... agreed. Reforms and reductions are in order.

In Musk's DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency), we see agreement-in-action with that assessment. He's taking a metaphorical chainsaw to the flesh, blood, bone and ligaments of our federal government.

Problem is, as the Wicked Witch of the West observed, these things must be done delicately.

To take a chainsaw to it? To move fast and break things?? To fix later the needful stuff we broke??? [Their words, not mine.]

Government is a complex adaptive system. In a computer system, the grid, an ecosystem or our own bodies, small failures - normally dampened by healthy, negative feedbacks - can sometimes push a system beyond a tipping point. After that... well... who knows? Things spin out of control. There is real risk that the computer crashes, the grid goes down, the ecosystem disintegrates, our bodies die.

Those of us who consider that a full collapse is possible are a tiny minority. We hear talk of deep recession, or even depression. Of the bull gone bear. Of debt and deficit. All these are seen as problems to resolve within a more or less functional system. Like treating cancer (Fox commentator analogy). 

Without entertaining possibility of collapse, one assumes that the system stumbles if we act to trip it up, but won't fall. Why be delicate? Why not use a chainsaw?

If our government were a patient with treatable cancer and a surgeon, foggy on anatomy and oncology, commenced removal by chainsaw... 

...Wanna bet on that patient's prognosis?

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Years ago, I read a study which modeled the random loss of institutional personnel lost in a pandemic context. The question was, what percentage of loss is the threshold for institutional failure? It was surprisingly low... I don't recall the exact figure, but it was well below 5%.

When personnel are lost, they take with them a quantity of 'institutional knowledge'... professional knowledge concerning the institution's field of purpose, networking  interconnections within the institution and external to it and functional knowledge of how to keep the lights on and pay the bills. And more. This was the original meaning of the phrase 'the Deep State' before it came to mean some secret, conspiratorial cabal embedded within government. It referred to institutional continuity despite the turmoil of politics.

The administration and DOGE purges aren't entirely random, but neither are they entirely directed. They have demonstrated a lack of understanding of the purpose, means and requirements of the agencies they've infiltrated and begun to mess with. One might argue that they have mis- or under estimated their importance as well, both in terms of mission and system function.

Their means (e.g., incentivizing resignations) aren't focused, but draw rather evenly from those who feel vulnerable, at the same time creating a situation in which all feel vulnerable. They're arbitrarily changing and in some cases breaking the mechanisms which underlie the whole (e.g., the governmental payment system).

On top of it all, the upper levels of agencies are being co-opted with loyal but inexperienced new-comers with axes to grind.

In our patient analogy, how long before a vital organ fails for lack of specialized cells? How long before the circulation system shuts down? How long before the central nervous system - mishandling the signals necessary to coordinate the body - stutter and seize?

And when the patient codes, where are the experts to resuscitate them?

EROEI / EROI For Doomies

 

“Pyramid of Energetic Needs” representing the minimum EROI required for conventional oil, at the well-head, to be able to perform various tasks required for civilization. The blue values are published values, the yellow values increasingly speculative. 

Chart from “EROI of Global Energy Resources Preliminary Status and Trends” Jessica Lambert, Charles Hall, Steve Balogh, Alex Poisson, and Ajay Gupta State University of New York, College of Environmental Science and Forestry

Oh, the ER-O-I was a'fallin'
And the win was gettin' low...

-- Adapted from the ER-I-O (Erie Canal) folksong

EROEI / EROI For Doomies

Energy Return On  Energy Invested, a.k.a., Energy Return On Invested is a core concept for those of us thinking of our present and near future. But it doesn't travel alone. Here, I'll try to lay out a useful set of related concepts, their dynamics and consequences.

Useful terms

EROEI -- The ratio of an amount  of energy divided by all necessary investment of all EI inputs (expressed as energy) required for ER outputs (energy extraction, refinement, production and distribution... from here on, I'll use the shorthand production for all of these).

Historically, EROI has fallen and is falling significantly. Lower numbers tend to account for more, often overlooked inputs.

Any complex, adaptive system (e.g., a living organism or an economy) requires an EROEI > 1 by some significant factor as its minimum for survival. This is in accord with the laws of thermodynamics, and remains undisputed.

NOTE: EROEI is often expressed as a ratio (EI/ER) or a proportion (usually EI:ER).

Gross Energy -- The total amount of extracted energy under discussion before adjusting for its production overheads.

Net Energy -- The amount of energy left over from Gross Energy after its production overheads.

Surplus Energy -- The amount of energy left over from Net Energy after systemic overheads (all the necessaries to support life). This is what's left over for electives.

NOTE: Gross and Net Energy can increase, even while EROI is falling. This has been the case, historically, prior to the present moment.

Peak Energy -- The point at which approximately half of energy resources have been extracted. At this point, the easy pickings have been picked and the (energy) cost of production for remaining, harder-to-access resources rises. From this point, required energy investment for extraction rises exponentially and EROI accordingly falls.

For further reading, see Hubbert Curves, which describe the prospects of any given resource being commercially extracted, and have successfully predicted Peak Energy for any given energy resource.

NOTE: Peak Energy from fossil fuels could conceivably become moot in the face of new energy sources, but for the foreseeable future, they are dominant and likely to remain so.

Implications

By industry assessments, we already have- or are soon to enter post-Peak Energy. EI to produce energy from fossil fuels will increase exponentially (rapidly declining EROEI and Net Energy).

Falling EROEI consequent to rising production costs in a post-Peak Energy environment chews away at Net Energy in proportion to Gross Energy. Gross Energy may be increasing, but the available Net Energy (GE minus overheads) is an ever smaller fraction of the gross. Eventually, as necessary extraction investments increase, Net Energy falls toward zero. 

At the same time, should Gross Energy plateau or decline (as considerable data suggest is now or soon to be the case), Net Energy falls toward zero.

For us Doomies, this is an alarming double squeeze!

Net Energy is what pays for shit. All the stuff we really need or think we need. All the stuff we think of as wealth. It's what Finances it. Grows it. Builds it. Produces it. Maintains it. Moves it around... roads, rail and bridges, shipping and supply chains. Keeps the lights on, water clean and flowing. Education, entertainment, arts. Everything. When we run too low on Net Energy and things start to fail for want of energy, it's TEOTWAWKI.

But it's slow to unbuild. As the surplus dwindles, things start to be under energized and fail at the fringes. It's made worse by wealth inequity, where the powerful turn wealth-sharing flows toward themselves. The disenfranchised don't have the energy/wealth/power to organize and defend themselves, and become prey to 'strongmen' who use their plight to their own ends.

As the surplus energy available to global, industrial civilization decreases, we can foresee the following:

• Failing infrastructures
• Increasing pollution (from energy investments, lower quality fuels, less remediation)
• Increasing climate instability
• Resource conflicts
  
  
• General impoverishment and reduction of total wealth
• Reductions of social services and safety nets
• A political turn toward far-right 'solutions'
• Increasingly authoritarian state control
• Increasing social unrest, protest, war and displacement
  
  
• Cascading failures and contagion proliferate
  
• Tipping points are reached
• Collapse

All of these (including localized Collapses, world-wide) are the major headlines of our day.

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Objections and IMHO

Here are a few of the standard objections to the above...

There's Still Plenty of Fossil Fuel

Well, yes - about half, give or take, and that's a LOT - but that's not the point.

The point is that that post-peak half is trending toward a point where its production is prohibitively expensive. The half that's left is less accessible, of lower quality (e.g., tar sands and shale) and/0r plays out more quickly (e.g., fracking). All this means low EROEI.

This is a consensus view among industry analysts (vs. PR types). Only the timing and what might intervene is in debate.

Green Tech will Save Us

Well, maybe, but both the will and a pathway are absent. It appears to be a long shot.

One large problem is that the conversion of existing infrastructure and systems to 'renewables' is energy (and materially) intensive, with its own, lowish EROEI. It is unclear whether, even given the will and commitment to the cross-over, that there would be enough Net Energy available for the task, not to mention related environmental impacts of the project.

Time is another... whether we have time for such conversion before some critical tipping point is reached? But of course that applies to all paths forward. Still, we're talking best case in terms of decades.

Tech Tech will Save Us

Well, maybe, but...

Alternative energy projects at BAU (Business As Usual) scale are promising but distant. Nuclear fusion has just passed operational EROEI slightly greater than 1. That is to say, a skosh over break-even so long as we don't count the infrastructure, conversion (heat to electricity) or distribution costs. This after years and billions of dollars in hot pursuit of the dream.

Deep-bore, grid-scale geothermal may be the best possibility in the offing. In this tech, high energy beams (from gyrotrons developed for nuclear fusion) replace mechanical drilling techniques for much deeper wells reaching into high heat regions of the Earth's mantle. It's in development, uses existing infrastructure for conversion/distribution and should be boot-strappable. Unfortunately, it too appears be well behind schedule with very little success to report. Bootstrapping is predicted to require decades.

The Market will Provide

Well, no. The market has worked wonders, but is not magical.

That the market will provide is an economic article of faith among Cornucopians who believe (more or less) that, given a high enough demand in the face of low supply, and substitutions can and will be made. 

This may be theoretically true but is pragmatically false. For example, since e=mc^2, given enough market incentive and energy, any resource could be synthesized. In practice, the EI of this approach would be prohibitive.

Further, the implicit assumption is that solutions will be found and implemented on demand (i.e., just-in-time innovation and production) given enough market incentive. Problem is, this flies in the face of considerable experience with Scientific Method... discoveries are not made on a schedule, regardless of the incentive. Industrial scale production is also far from instantaneous. Other market forces, such as cost, are in opposition.

An example would be the fairly recent discovery of one of the side-effects of sildenifil citrate, originally studied as a treatment for high blood-pressure... despite vast market incentive and effort across centuries, this active ingredient of Viagra(R) is without an historical peer. It was observed serendipitously during clinical studies, and, approximately 12 years later, hit the market.

Who says it's all gloom and doom?

Bottom Line

The bottom line is that EROEI and related concepts are a lens for viewing the lifeblood of our global industrial economy and civilization.

That EROEI and Net Energy are falling with nothing assured in prospect would indicate that we are suffering from terminal, congestive heart failure.

Time to set our affairs in order.

For further reading, here's a good place to start.

Forgetting How to Farm

 

It ain't the Old Days

Hell, before the War we was all organic farmers.

-- Overheard between two elder farmers in the 1960s

Forgetting How to Farm

One of the themes I yammer on about, here, is that things are different this time... that history is not a reliable guide for the collapse of modern civilization. And forgetting how to farm is one of the main reasons I believe this to be so.

I stipulate that more food is being produced, today, by fewer people than ever before in human history. Furthermore, I accept that modern transport and preservation technologies help maximize distribution and minimize scarcity.

So how, you may ask, can I argue that we have forgotten how to farm?

In a very real sense, human agriculture and animal husbandry are new on the scene. As homo sapiens we have only been farming for a tiny fraction of our existence. Nevertheless, some thousand generations hammered out their ways and means.

Only in the last eight millennia – a mere slice of deep time – did civilizational farming emerge. At first confined to flood plains and favored pockets. Later irrigated by labor and mechanical means. The horse harnessed and the plow perfected. Cultivars developed and breeds bred. Crop regimens and rotations increased yield. A host of supplementary technologies sprouted alongside, gradually improving the efficacy of farming within the budgets of sun and land (though not always the case).

And we thrived on its abundance. Our numbers grew in steady, exponential increase. Malthus famously plotted population growth versus the growth of food production and (correctly) warned of famine if trends continued.

Also famously, they did not. The discovery of the New World and its crops (especially potato and maize (corn)) and nitrate deposits bought some breathing room. The Industrial Revolution and fossil fuels brought new, mechanical muscle to the land. Dams and deep well technology allowed irrigation far from surface water tables. Chemistry brought pest- and herbicides and, best of all, the means to liberate vital nitrogen from the atmosphere.

And now, monoculture, 'marketable' hybrids, GMOs (Genetically Modified Organisms), slash-and-burn practices and other profit accelerants are displacing ever more traditional varieties.

What could possibly go wrong?

Well... there are costs. Arable acreage lost to 'development'. Topsoil loss and salination. Accumulating toxins in soil and environment. Fresh water and aquifer depletion and pollution. Evolving resistance among pests and infectious agents. New diseases leaping via crowded domesticated species to ourselves. Climate impacts. Ecosystem infringement and collapses. Our own burgeoning numbers as other species fade and fail. Systemic stress across the spectrum.

Each of these, individually, undermines the conditions for agriculture. Collectively, they undermine the very foundations of agriculture. Still, that's not the problem, per se. Societies have faced combinations of these factors in the past, and variously thrived, transformed or fell with trauma relatively local in time and space. Hence the notion that the past is a guide to the future..

But, in the course of only two or three generations, we have all but lost the means to farm without industrial technology. Should we stumble in our course – should the inputs from the grid, industrial chemistry, seed, fuel and machinery, transport, cold storage, processing and canning pause for longer than we can live from food on hand... if we collectively miss a planting season... what then?

The (approximately) two persons directly involved in the feeding of each hundred of us would be hard pressed to feed themselves in such a case (actual farmers are a small percentage of those persons). Hybrid seed is only worth a single crop. Plowing, planting and harvesting by hand (to name only three steps)? Water must flow by gravity or locally-powered pump. How to store the harvest? How to distribute it? To whom? Some jury rig is possible... modern understanding may ease the reinvention of some practices... but we'd be in deep doo doo.

Could something bring the global economy to a halt? I and others argue (elsewhere) that yes, it could, and sooner or later, will. Like the human body, any complex adaptive system is mortal. Blunt trauma, infection and 'normal accidents' go with the territory.

History does guide us in this; all civilizations come to an end. Ours is now global.

My great-Grandfather knew how to farm the old way. In his lifetime, truck and tractor replaced horse and wagon. He saw harvesters and later combines run the hands from field to city. By the end of his life, he was a living anachronism.

The Amish, Mennonites and Hutterites still carry the torch, but their entire output can feed no more than a small, modern city. Third World farmers are often much closer to traditional ways, but taken together can feed no more than a small, modern country.

Peoples of the Stone, Bronze and Iron Ages, the first farmers, those who came after through WWII... they all carried with them knowledge and tools that we have scattered or lost. For some thousand generations, the ways and means of agriculture and husbandry carried survivors forward through thick and thin. But it is different this time...

We have forgotten how to farm.

PS. Even worse, we have forgotten how to live as non-farmers in the wild. How many of us thrown 'naked into the wilderness' could survive, much less thrive? How many could build a shelter or make fire? Gather wild forage? Hunt or fish with DIY tools? Dress our wounds? Find our way?

But all these things can be learned. If nothing else, they comprise a fascinating hobby!

The Half Urban World for Doomies

Rapid globalization and economic conditions will continue to produce increasing uncertainties and risks, as well as new opportunities that will impact all phases of urbanization—often with unanticipated consequences. As a result, uncertainty must be a critical component of planning and policymaking. Economic uncertainty must be taken into consideration when new and innovative projects are developed to ensure that they are “successful” in local and global terms, and better equipped to withstand fluctuations in local and global economies.

-- From Urban Policy in an Uncertain Economy by the East-West Center


The Half Urban World for Doomies

(Roughly rounded terms, ahead. Original numbers gleaned from UN, IMF and World Bank sources ...)

• About 10,000 years back, agricultural civilizations first arose. From that time through the 1700s, it took from 95 to 98 persons actively engaged in farming to support 100 people; themselves and 2 to 5 non-farmers. Today - leveraged via modern, industrial technologies heavily reliant on fossil fuels - 2 to 5 farmers support 100 people when averaged worldwide.
  
• In recent decades, lean production and inventory philosophy (Just In Time or JIT production and supply) has become widespread. This means inventories of supplies on hand are kept to a minimum. In the case of urban centers in the U.S., food vendors and local warehouses are stocked on average to supply only two to three days of normal demand.

• A few years back, we passed the Half-Urban World mark. This means that more than half of us now live in urban concentrations of 2000 or more people. Current world population about 7,500,000,000 souls.

Each dot is a point along one of several exponential curves -seldom related - each of which now describes rapid, dramatic change.

Each development, in itself seems just another historical milestone on our road to the stars. Each a symbol of progress marking our advance as a species.

Taken together, they comprise an unprecedented recipe for disaster.

What we see is a situation in which an otherwise short-lived cessation of urban supply is going to have drastic consequences for urban populations who, in their desperation, will damage critical infrastructure beyond hope of recovery.

Supply chain failure essentially stops most food production in its tracks. Without steady inputs of seedstocks, fertilizers, feed, fuels, parts and manpower, production and distribution grind to a halt, with a horizon of the next planting/harvest cycle. Irrigated areas would soon lose water, as would many reliant on pumped ground and aquifer waters. No markets or transport, no point in harvest even where possible. Livestock would be put down as feed on hand is exhausted, saving only what can be pasture fed.

The hundred fed by each one or two farmers would go hungry, even if some emergency transport were arranged.

What follows is my best guess as to how this might play out on a near global scale. There will be many variations, especially among towns set in low density, rural areas. Size and local food production industries may follow a different course. Third world urban areas may have better local supply, but tend to be high density.

Stage One: Urban Implosion

This plays out much as collapse fiction portrays it. Panic, food riots, collapse of utilities and services, overwhelmed police and emergency services, emergence of gangs controlling resources and black market trade.

What is often overlooked, I believe is damage to urban infrastructures, including many which are vital to service extra-urban regions. Rioting, fire and looting can easily damage power and water stations and conduits, telecommunications, fuel storage, computer networks, railway and general equipment. Experienced, irreplaceable personnel will not be able to commute, abandon their stations to protect their families, and/or be lost to violence.

In fairly short order, without resupply, resources on hand will be exhausted or hoarded out of reach of many to most.

Stage Two: Urban Explosion

Individuals and small groups must at some point decide to abandon the city in search of food. Water and shelter will be of constant concern.

Likely, roads will be beset by 'highwaymen', exacting a toll of refugees.

Surrounding suburban areas, where present, will have their own pitfalls and dynamics, both for residents and for the refugees flowing out of the cities. Food here will likely have been exhausted or corralled as well. Their mere extant along with attrition from violence will cut into refugee numbers. Never the less, I expect many (hundreds to millions, depending on initial population) will reach the rural surrounds.

Stage Three: 'Locust' Behaviors Threaten Rural Populations

By this time, people will be desperate and ravenous. Every animal, grain, food or material deemed edible will be consumed. Every rumor that can be pursued will be, as mobs large and small pour through the countryside.

In particular, gardens will be uprooted and seedstock consumed. 

At some point, cannibalism becomes inevitable.

EROEI Energy Return On Energy Invested), I believe, will play a large role in this phase. Pillaging individuals and groups must achieve a net return, or they starve out. Dense or concentrated resources may support larger groups organized as bandits or raiders, but these will deplete quickly. Low density or well hidden resources will not, and any bandits straying into these areas will burn out.

It is an open question as to whether ex-urban mobs will topple rural societies, which will have problems of their own when supply fails. Clearly, initial urban numbers will be well down. Rural populations will diminish, but likely not to the proportional degree as urbogenic ones. They will also have intimate local knowledge on their side. It may be that some can hold out and retain social cohesion.

In this stage, something I think of as Demographic Winter (analogous to Nuclear Winter) seems possible. Large numbers of ex-urbanites burn what they can for warmth and cooking. Some percentage will get out of hand in uncontrolled forest and prairie fires. Globally. Smoke produced will likely have climate scale consequences for some time, further stressing survivors.
Stage Four: Forage, Gardening? and Husbandry?

Sooner or later, the population much reduced, small bands will begin to relearn wild forage and hunting technologies.

Limited gardening may begin as non-hybrid seed caches are discovered, and growth propagated from those which escape being eaten. Hybridized cloned varieties may survive for propagation in this phase, as well, so long as they are not overly dependent for success on insecticides and other industrial measures.

Livestock may be propagated. Most draft animal technologies as well.

But propagation of skills, plant- or animal stocks, takes time.

Of course, somewhere in here, domestic nuclear plants and spent rod storage facilities go LOCA.

Stage Four: Return to Organic Agriculture?

Assuming our species makes it this far, methods of organic agriculture, if it happens at all, will have to restore what is remembered and reinvent much that has been lost, under conditions of changed climate.

My guess is that this stage is unlikely. That we will not return to agriculture in any near future (millennial scale), and will likely have to rediscover it by the time we do.

But most of human experience did without it, and by some estimations, were better off before its adoption transformed us.


*****

Are full economic and urban collapse  plausible? And if so, are these dynamics likely?

If we are indeed approaching the limits to growth (see this blog's header), the conditions underlying the capital-based, global industrial economy. Events over the last 45 years are in high conformity with that hypothesis. We have seen the depicted curves flattening, with the model suggesting the dropside is nearly on us. Should a tipping point initiate cascading failures which outstrip capacity to halt them, ensuing collapse may well be catastrophic.

Global economic collapse is entirely conceivable to the IMF, World Bank and central bankers at national and international levels. Crushing global debt (national, corporate, individual), fiat currencies weakened by quantitative easing, non-productive spending (e.g., military), wealth disparity, rising cost of insurance, unstable business environment... and under it all plummeting EROEI on fossil fuels... are seen individually as potential threats to the global economy. Collectively, they are ominous indeed. Notice that growth within a limited system is not appreciably on their radar.

Global supply chain cessation would be the natural result of economic collapse (arrest). Again, there are many historical cases of financial breakdown leading to supply interruption. Typically, these have been short lived as support arrived, originating from stable surrounds.

Are tools available sufficient to restore confidence and restart interrupted global trade in a time to avert runaway, systemic failures (of which urban collapse is an example)? It's a matter of debate, but the very concept of 'too big to fail' implies that failure is not an option since it brings down the house. Once something big gives, it may well be that issues multiply faster than they can be brought under control.

There have been many historical examples of dramatic urban collapse due to war (especially siege), local economic collapse or natural disaster. Most of them follow stages one through three to some degree. Deviations appear to be more or less proportional to how much outside supply and assistance they receive, and how soon 'normalcy' is restored. How well the general population is armed plays a role. Long duration and/or lack of significant outside assistance makes the worst case the probable case.

Should supply chains fail, military and National Guard assets, running on strategic reserves, may attempt to run stopgap supply services. But the task will be enormous, and efforts diluted by attempts to establish order and control. Personnel will be difficult to keep on task as they go AWOL in support of families, taking what they can get away with. Most assets will be stranded overseas.

To my mind, the combination of low on hand inventories, food producer to consumer ratio and staggering numbers of the people involved and the high aspect ratio of critical dependencies in service infrastructures mean that we are in uncharted territory. 

That the transition from functional to desperate can proceed in remarkably short order. 
That urban breakdown will not be confined within urban city limits.
That the infrastructures necessary for restoration of function can be damaged beyond repair.
That rapid population loss - both urban and rural - can be catastrophic.

In a scenario of global economic arrest, extrapolate outward, demographic explosion from every urban center, world wide. Looking at a map, the world appears a minefield..


*****

In regard to the rural vs. urban bug-out debate, the preceding considerations suggest that rural wins hands down.

Urban areas, producing no significant foods from their own ground must be abandoned. Sooner or later, survivors will bug out rural. Those already rural will be ahead of them.

A further observation is that, the farther one is from urban concentrations, the better, lest the locust phase sweep over your position.

My advice? Relocate rural, now.

Git while the gittin's good.





PS. I searched the terms "half urban world" collapse in several variations looking for serious, non-fiction analyses, and found little to nothing (mostly my own, amateur efforts!).

I would welcome serious consideration of global urban collapse dynamics by anyone who's guesses might be better informed and referenced than my own.

Musings on the Archdruid's Comments on Korowicz

One of many possible Tipping Points for Humpty

Cartoon by Tom Toles of the Washington Post

All the King's horses

And all the King's men

Couldn't put Humpty together again. 

Musings on the Archdruid's Comments on Korowicz

I am one who reads both the works of David Korowicz, with whom I largely agree, and John Michael Greer, with whom I largely disagree. They represent reasoned poles of the fast vs. slow collapse debate.

David Korowicz has written numerous papers examining Catastrophic Collapse (fast and deep). Principal among them is Trade-Off: A Study in Global Systemic Collapse. It's tough going, but well worth the effort.

He describes the global economy in systems terms.

The global system includes a handful of hubs - agriculture, energy, finance, IT, transport, water/sewage -  critical to the on-going function of the global system. All elements of the system are interdependent to some degree and most are dependent on one or more hubs. A failure in one element can spread to the next in a process called contagion. Failure of interdependent elements can infect a hub. Failure of any one hub brings down vast swathes of the system, and likely one or more others. Enough loss of function and the system collapses, fast and furious.

Historically, crises in the modern global system have been overcome by adaptive and  negative feedback mechanisms (directed and reflexive responses which curb runaway behaviors and ease the system toward normal function). But there are limits. He writes, "...our experiences of diverse system collapses, albeit on a smaller scale, should warn us to be cautious in our assumptions.

Korowicz builds his case and concludes that the global system is stressed and near a tipping point, beyond which contagion spreads at an accelerating rate which overwhelms available response mechanisms, and the system as a whole fails.

Okay... what does Greer think?

John Michael Greer blogs eloquently at thearchdruidreport.com, and has proposed a theory of Catabolic Collapse (slow and staged in the Long Descent). This theory is founded on the assumption that history is a reliable guide to the future, specifically in respect to the rise and fall of civilizations.

In his post, The Far Side of Denial, he devotes a large portion to an effort to rebut the Fast Collapse conclusions of Trade-Off.

In essence, he argues that some combination of actions and effects can and will always halt runaway collapse on the scale of a civilization. Always has, always will. No reason to think it's different this time.

Greer concurs with Korowicz' assessment of current affairs and that collapse is imminent or underway. He differs in that he believes that responsive actions and mechanisms limit the drop. That multiple collapses will continue in more or less descending, stair-step fashion, playing out over generations.

To my mind, his rebuttal misses the mark. I will argue that a) capacity to arrest collapse is limited , b) Korowicz addresses actions that might be attempted and c) we are in historically uncharted waters.

Greer supplies the historical example of the systemic US banking crises of 1932/33, introducing the crux of his rebuttal. He writes:

It’s the sequel, though, that didn’t get into Korowicz’ analysis. Faced with the imminent reality of national collapse, the US government did not sit on its hands, which is what those with the capacity to do something are always required to do in fast collapse theories.
...
A nation facing collapse, it bears remembering, has plenty of options, and it also has the means, motive, and opportunity to use them.

First, in fast collapse theories, it is definitely not required that anyone sit on their hands. One the contrary Korowicz (among others) anticipates a great deal of effort to recover, contain or regroup once a tipping point occurs. But his analysis indicates that, beyond a certain threshold, these efforts are insufficient. Crises spread faster than damage control mechanisms can cope, thier own systems failing as the crisis deepens.

In this quoted passage, Greer is challenging Korowicz' assessment that "governments will respond to the crisis by choosing the minimal option they think will solve the immediate problem" (JMG's paraphrase). He considers this an assumption, rather than a conclusion.

Yet, taken in context Korowicz concludes that governments are unlikely to take decisive action in advance of a crisis, and lag behind a rapidly unfolding one. This itself has plenty of historical precedent.

Korowicz  explicitly discusses inhibitions to prior action and several drastic response approaches (historically more or less effective) with detailed analysis of why they would come up short should the global system tip. He further examines radical approaches that have never been tried and finds them wanting.

In other words, he very much includes action on the part of those able to act.

I'll stipulate that a nation (aware that it is) facing collapse has plenty of options and motives to use them. But are those options both viable and sufficient to the task? Unproven at best. Past success is no guarantor of future success. Many of the options available in past crises are long gone from the table.

Future options are unspecified and can only be guessed at. At best, they are likely to be improvisational (see Greer's 'kluged together response' from his defibrillation analogy, below).

Means? Maybe; but in many cases doubtful. Means to avert some threats are physically out of reach, some technically so and others would break the bank.

Opportunity? There's the little matter of adequate time. Responses require time. In any given crisis there is but a window of opportunity before responders are overwhelmed.

That these allusions to unspecified 'drastic' options 'bear remembering' presuppose Greer's conclusion, and fail to address Korowicz' well-developed and explicit arguments to the contrary.

It is insufficient capacity to stabilize a tipped system which implies fast collapse after a tipping point.

Should the system tip and hubs fail, those who might act are in the dark without power. Lost without communication.  Immobile without transport. Starving without food or water. Blind, toothless and very soon struggling to survive. Yesterday's plenty languishing undeliverable. Tomorrow's waiting for the smoke to clear.

Capacity degrades even as opportunity slams shut. Like the rest of us, all the King's horses and all the King's men are constrained by the resources on hand..

Is the past a reliable guide to the future in terms of fast vs. slow collapse?

Greer's assumption that 'nothing is (fundamentally) different  this time' dismisses critical technologies that demonstrably and fundamentally alter the contexts through which historiical events must pass.

To pick one example, in 1859, the Carrington Event (high magnitude solar storm) caused telegraph systems around the world to fail and spark, causing many fires. Telegraph wires acted as antennas, capturing enough energy to exceed limits.

Before about 1850, the Event would have had little to no impact whatsoever, as telegraph technology had not yet become widespread. By 1859 its impact was profound. Now... well. Now we're wired.

Sophisticated circuitry doesn't hold up nearly as well as telegraph wire.We might have the means to shield all our vital electrical and electronics (as one might against EMP). But we haven't yet shown the will. In another such event we'd certainly develop that will.

But all the King's horses and all the King's men would arrive too late with too little. Would Humpty merely suffer a few cracks, or be reduced to egg drop soup? The past cannot rule the latter out.

Clearly, to state that X has never happened does not mean it can't or won't. Or that we survived a previous (superficially) similar event, so we will survive the next. All history plays out in context. Solutions to previous problems cannot be simply repeated. Cause and effect propagate differently as linkages change.

New technologies create new conditions:

They multiply the number of interacting parts, (inter)dependenciesparts and overall complexity. They supplant historical infrastructures - organic agriculture, beasts of burden, localized economies. They interrupt or degrade the transmission of skills all but lost after a single generation's hiatus. They supplant and degrade whole ecosystems. They expose us to dangers our species never imagined, much less faced.

Change the context (system), change the flow of history. In matters of kind, quantity, complexity and tempo, we live in a changed world. Despite historical resemblances, guidance and intact commonalities, we are in new and uncharted territory.

***** 

Greer concludes with the following (emphasis mine):

Korowicz’ study points to one very plausible way that the next major round of crisis could slam into the industrial world. The fact that the nations affected by it could kluge together responses to it, slap the equivalent of defibrillator paddles onto their prostrate economies, and get a heartbeat again for the time being doesn’t change the fact that a financial collapse followed by even a partial supply chain breakdown would be a massive crisis, the sort of thing that could well plunge hundreds of millions of people into permanent poverty and push the global economy further down a long ragged decline that will be much less amenable to drastic responses.  We’re in agreement, in effect, that the patient is terminally ill; the question is simply whether first aid measures available to the paramedics on site can get his heart beating again, so he can drag out the dying process for a while longer.

 As a paramedic I feel this analogy (patient in cardiac arrest) is apt, but weighs in against Greer's thesis..

It is not at all a 'fact' that defibrillation, even at the hands of skilled technicians, can reliably 'get his heart beating again', much less a "kluged together response". Nor is it sufficient. Once a patient tips over into cardiac arrest, they are in crisis with severe danger of whole system collapse.

Absent prompt, correct action and well managed recovery, the patient will likely die in very short order.

Here's the concluding analogy from Trade-Off:

Collectively, it is like we are passengers traveling in an unimaginably complex plane locked onto a perilous course. Our understanding of the engine and guidance system is partial, nor do we know many of the connections between them. We may want to change course by retooling the guidance system, but there is a meaningful risk it will stall the engine, and we’ll plummet to the ground. Good risk management might argue that before repairs are done, we ensure the passengers have parachutes, but time is running out, maybe it already has.

Greer presumes a Horn of Plentiful Options to intervene should this plane begin to plummet He appeals to the authority of the past.I can't follow him there. But...

Collapse - fast or slow - is the unproven negative until it happens.

We all come to believe, one way or another. Life is an act of faith. I believe the value of debate is refinement one's understanding. Through debate, we may confirm our conclusions, be persuaded of our opponents' or be inspired to new possibilities.

My advice is to prepare for the worst (fast collapse), hope for the best (slow collapse) and take what comes with prepperation!







For more on the Carrington event, see NASA news and analysis. In 2012, a solar storm of similar magnitude narrowly missed the earth.

The Farmer is the One Who Feeds Them All

If you'll only look and see, then I think you will agree
That the farmer is the man who feeds them all.

-- American Folk Song

The Farmer is the One Who Feeds Them All

In prehistoric times, there were few known urban centers of 2,000 persons or more.

Recently, we passed a milestone marking the half-urban world. More than half of us now live in urban centers ranging from 2K persons to mega-cities in the tens of millions.

At the height of the Roman Empire, there were fewer people alive than now live in the U.S., alone. For every person alive then, there are around 25 persons alive, now.

At the founding of the U.S., around 90% of the population were farmers.

Today in the U.S., between 1 and 2% are farmers. Of these, virtually none are subsistent, organic farmers, meaning they are reliant on fossil fuels, fertilizers, purchase of seed stock and markets.

Globally, traditional farming skills, means, lands and infrastructure has been degraded or wholly lost.

Climate change - whether or not it is anthropogenic - is making serious inroads into agricultural outputs. Top-soil loss, salinization, fresh water depletion, introduced and resistant pests are increasing their toll. All threaten worse.

For the first time in human history, agriculture broke the hunter/gatherer mode of life, and we grew dependent on the farmer.

A series of green revolutions has vastly increased the farmer's efficiency, but also their dependency on non-farm goods and services.

For the first time in agricultural history, we depend in unprecedented numbers on the production of one or two among a hundred of us, and therefore the uninterrupted flow of those same goods and services.

What's more, the chain of transmission of hard won organic agriculture technologies has been broken and all but lost. Modern farmers across the first world have lost the ways and means to grow non-hybrid food in quantity. Seed stock is not available in quantity; fossil fuels empower every aspect of modern farming.

In the third world, farmers retain more traditional, low tech skills, but rely on ever more inputs from the global economy to manage their crops.

Should the inter-dependent hubs fail - energy, transport, finance, IT/communications, water/sewage... failure of one takes down all - so does the supply of critical, agricultural tools and materials and the markets for whom their assets and production is geared.

Should any of the conditions fail that allow the few to feed the many...

What happens in the mega-cities? The cities? The towns? Who will feed them? What will they eat? What will they do?

What might 3.75 thousand million desperate people do?

Exponential Growth for Doomies

A whirlwind tour of growth versus limits

The problem is, exponential growth patterns 

don't give you an early warning sign.

Because the dangers really speed up at the end, 

when it's too late to do anything about it.

-- Dr. Kent Moors 
  

Exponential Growth for Doomies:       
      Double, Double, Toil and Trouble

We all think we're familiar with growth.

If we can earn $1000 a week, that's $4000 a month and $48,000 a year. Nice, neat and linear, right? Most of what we count in our everyday lives is like that.

But exponential growth aka geometric growth aka non-linear growth aka compounded growth isn't as intuitive. Even if one is familiar with it, this kind of growth can ambush us.

If something is growing exponentially, each dollop added to the heap is proportional to (a fraction of) the heap that's already there. The bigger the heap, the bigger the dollop, the bigger the heap the bigger the dollop... a dash, a pinch, a dollop, a handful, a bucket.....

We typically say the heap is growing at some percent rate per unit of time, say 5% annually (that is, 5% of the total heap size added to the heap every year... the amount added gets bigger each year).

Or we might think in terms of doubling rate, or doubling time (the time it takes the heap to double in size). Each doubling period... tick, tick, tick... doubles the entire heap.

The rate of change may stay the same, but the increment of change - the dollop of change - gets bigger. And bigger. And BIGGER! As we go from the more horizontal portion of an exponential curve to the more vertical portion, any given stretch of time - a year; a decade; a lifetime - spans an astonishing increase. Each stretch encompasses an ever more fantastic volume of change.

An exponential curve is sometimes called a 'hockey-stick'. Things are flattish for a while, there is a transitional middle, then things get steep.

Things might look nearly flat for a long, long time (like my father before me, time out of mind; as if nothing will ever change). It took us millions of years to learn to control fire, for example.

Then things pick up to an exciting time of change for the better (that old woman saw the first automobile AND the first moonshot).

Things pick up more, and things get a little scary (That kid born in 2000 is now looking at super bugs, cyber warfare and an ice-free arctic).

In a finite system (the only kind we know of), nothing continues doubling forever. Most systems can be described in boom / bust cycles. Exponential growth for a giddy while, then crash. Sometimes repeat. Sometimes not.

Rule of 69 or 70

The Rule of 69 (or 70) is a handy rule-of-thumb which allows a rough estimation of doubling time given the percent rate of growth per unit of time. Using 70 is slightly less accurate than 69, but the math is often slightly easier.

Doubling-Rate = 70 / %Rate-of-Growth 

If our average rate of growth is 5% per year, then 70/5 = 14 years... our heap will double in 14 years. If the rate of growth is quarterly, say, it would double in 14 quarters.

Let's say an economy grows at 2.5% per year on average. By our rule of 70,  70/2.5 = about 30 years. At that rate, the economy will double in 30 years. If this rate is sustained, it will double every 30 years.

Consequences

In rough terms, the global, industrial economy - the world's heap of goods, services and assets; its pollution, environmental impact, its footprint - has been doubling every 25 years for the last two hundred (give or take).This means today's global economy is roughly 256 times that of 1800. Double the economy of 1990. Next stop, 512x!

At every doubling, close to twice the resources are consumed. Twice the waste produced. Twice the 'footprint' is required, as it were. The next doubling is due about 20 years from today according to the IMF.

A 'next doubling' assumes nothing happens big enough to derail that juggernaut. It has mass. It has momentum. If it hits a wall or leaves the tracks it'll make one hell of a wreck.

My friends, we live in a time when the now vast human world is doubling every few decades.

 
We Doomies think that, coming somewhere soon-ish along the economic curve, something's gotta give. We'll hit the limits our planet can support. And then the trend will break. Break bad.

Now here's the thing: Just before that last doubling - the one that can't fit within limits and brings down the house  of cards - the world looks to have half of its reserves left. We've taken all of human history to saturate the world to today's level, only those few decades (if that) to double it. Or go bust.

How many more doublings have we got?

For further consideration, I suggest the Crash Course, free from the team at Peak Prosperity. Episode #3 focuses on exponential growth.

How Systems Collapse: Human Body Analogy

 

...Slowly, at first, then all at once.

-- Dmitry Orlov

How Systems Collapse: The Human Body Analogy

I would say that most persons who entertain the notion of Collapse picture some version of Slow Collapse. Aka Catabolic Collapse aka the Long Descent.

Those of us who foresee Fast Collapse appear to be a distinct minority.

I read on-line that many cannot imagine the complete failure of a system as vast and complex as the Global Industrial Economy, along with its embedded Global Civilization. It seems too big to fail. They will not let it collapse!

Here to help you imagine is the example of the Human Body, a vast (trillions of cells), highly evolved, Complex Adaptive System.

Our human body is as familiar to us as...  well... as the back of our own hand. That it ages, suffers illness and trauma, wears out important parts... none of this surprises us. That the body is mortal is dead certain.

Bodily systems typically decline over years in a process one might think of as Slow Collapse. Arteries harden. Muscle mass is lost. Bones weaken. The mind's reach shortens. Whether one is a Yogic Master or couch potato, age takes its toll. Decline may be faster or slower, but it is relentless. We may suffer deficits or enjoy partial recoveries, but from conception, entropy holds us in its dissipating grip.

Illness or trauma can degrade or damage particular limbs, organs or systems. Our immune, digestive, cardio-pulmonary, neurological systems – to name a few – can slow and stutter.

We are borne in stages toward our final crisis.

The eventual mechanism of our demise is uncertain, but the prognosis is not. Sooner or later, some break-down – large or small – will abruptly escalate to total system failure. Whether from a state of good health or struggling with diminished function, when the crisis comes, our system is tipped from being a massively intricate, integrated, living body, to a collection of dis-integrated cells dying in isolation.

For example, cardiac collapse begins with a small system failure (blood supply, electrical signal, valve failure, etc.). Once the 'pump' stops, blood is neither oxygenated nor distributed throughout the body. Cellular waste products are neither transported nor processed. Even with CPR, the system is going downhill fast. Organs, dependent on the heart's function, degrade or fail. Bodily elements, dependent on those organs degrade and fail.

Without prompt, correct, decisive intervention (and most often even with that advantage), the patient undergoes Fast Collapse.

TEOTWAKI.

There are many ways to come to terms with mortality. Seize the day. Eat, drink and be merry. Reach out in love to those around us. Far from paralyzing us, the prospect of our personal finitude can be a catalyst to live. And so might it be with global Collapse of Civilization. The fact of mortality itself needn't lead us to throw in the towel.

Point is, we're all too familiar with Fast Collapse in highly evolved, complex adaptive systems.

In terms of the human body, we understand the mechanisms of collapse far better than its workings. In terms of the industrial economy, we understand neither, for all our economic theory. What we do understand of systems is that they can be driven out of their range of stability, and become vulnerable to catastrophic collapse.

Fast Collapse is not simply some pessimistic, Doomerish nay say, per se, to be dismissed with the lifting of a skeptical brow. It's not Schadenfreude, delighting in Goetterdeamerung. It's not even a narrative, competing with others for prime time. Instead, it is an argument based on the doings and undoings of complex adaptive systems.

The prime mission of this blog is to lay out that systems theoretic argument in an accessible manner. To that end, I'll be presenting Systems Theory for Doomies in following posts, along with renditions of the major, systems based arguments supporting Fast Collapse.

And why?

Fast Collapse calls for very different preparation measures than does Slow Collapse. While no preparation guarantees success; no preparation might very well guarantee failure.

Go not gently into that good night!

Pascal's Wager, Adapted for Prepperation

Calvin's Wager
by Bill Watterson

Yes; but you must wager. It is not optional. You are embarked. Which will you choose then?
-- From Pensees by Blaise Pascal

To make a choice is to change the future.
-- Deepak Chopra


Pascal's Wager, Adapted for Prepperation

Blaise Pascal considered the question of how a rational person, in the absence of proof, should wager (bet) with respect to God's existence. It is an early example of decision theory.

Paraphrased (and stripped to bare bones), the argument runs like this:

If God does not exist, belief in Him costs one little.
If God does exist, disbelief costs one much.
Therefore,  it is rational to wager that He does exist, and act accordingly.

Let's restate that in terms of Collapse:

If Collapse is not coming, preparation costs one little.
If Collapse is coming, lack of preparation costs one much.
Therefore, it is rational to wager that Collapse is coming, and prepare accordingly.

Wanna bet?

Fast or Slow Collapse: Why it Matters

The Days of Wind
by Qin YongJun

Slowly, at first, then all at once.
-- Dmitry Orlov on Fragility and Collapse


Fast or Slow Collapse: Why it Matters


Fast and slow are relative terms.

From the perspective of centuries and relative to its duration, the fall of the Roman Empire was relatively abrupt. From the perspective of individuals involved, however, many experienced little change in the course of their lifetimes. It was a Long Descent from the peak of its expansion, through crises and contractions to the Dark Age that followed.

When we contemplate the Collapse of the modern global economy with so much that it entails, many are persuaded that it will be a similar, Long Descent, declining catabolically in fits and spurts over generations, in keeping with most known historical precedent.

Fast Collapse types (myself included) are persuaded that descent will likely be abrupt on our time scale, crashing catastrophically from near peak to near zero in the course of days to months.

Why does this matter? Why isn't it a genteel debate whose outcome will become clear in time... the loser will stand the next round of beer? Why shouldn't we just wait and see?

My answer is that the two scenarios call for vastly different preparations, and on a very different deadline.

If the Long Descent lies ahead of us, our best bet is to establish locally resilient communities, capable of carrying forward in reduced circumstances. The learning curve is relatively gradual for dealing with the economic environment as it (d)evolves. For most, there will be world enough, and time.

But should Catastrophic Collapse be the case, we are more or less flung onto our own resources, struggling amid all others mired in a fully similar plight, minus any functional economy at all.

I present two analogies for slow and fast Collapse, respectively. They are imperfect but illustrate the different preparations which would be important.

Here's an analogy for Slow, Catabolic Collapse:

The TITANIC strikes an island and goes hard aground. The lower hull is flooded and many of the ships stores are ruined, but there is no immediate risk of sinking. The generators go down, and with it many of the ship's systems. But most crew and passenger decks are clear of water. Passengers, while dazed, turn to and begin to work with crew to aid the injured, ensure dry shelter for those impacted and ration supplies. They do best who have good relationships with others aboard - both socially and those with skills. Eventually, some power may be restored and longer term plans undertaken. And so on. But the island has limited resources... things will get worse before they get better.

And one for Fast, Catastrophic Collapse:

The TITANIC strikes an iceberg and sinks within hours. There are no lifeboats (preparations are the responsibility of individuals). Most flounder in the water with a very brief window of survival. Many are drowned by their panicked, desperate neighbors who attempt anything to live. Some had prepared for this emergency, as best the could. Of these, many don't make it; pulled down by the floundering masses. Some fail due to poor choices. A few, thanks to adequate preparation and good fortune survive the immediate disaster. And so on. But they are now adrift among many resources (analogy breaks down, here) but with little to no hope of assistance.

I'm not going to argue, here, for Fast Collapse, though that is my persistent conclusion. But once Collapse begins in earnest one's choices may be tightly constrained. In the face of Fast Collapse, a 'wait and see' approach is likely to become 'waited too long'.

I urge that deciding which scenario is ahead/immanent, and acting upon that decision is a matter of life and death for you and yours. To wait and see is to have made a decision.

A last observation, however... preparations for Slow Collapse do not address Fast concerns, but those for Fast Collapse perform valuable service in many likely Slow scenarios. Even if never called upon, these do no harm. They are like fire escapes which may never be used...

...But you're gonna want 'em once all hell breaks loose.





PS.  This may be the place to mention that I often hear a cheap kind of psycho-analysis speculating on why people conclude whether fast, slow, or indeed any Collapse is probable.We all assess what facts we can, relate them, and attempt predictions to the best of our ability.

Those persuaded that Collapse is likely don't glory in it. Fast Collapse folks don't want to avoid a long, arduous Descent. Slow Collapse folks don't wish to avoid a traumatic, desperate Catastrophe.

I mean, isn't the Future hard enough to contemplate without second guessing motives?